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The establishment of new government organizations
 
and redirection of existing ones to manage new science
 
programs of the future is anticipated. These agencies
 
will not be pri'marily aimed toward national defense
 
objectives. However, on the basis of past experience9
 
most of these new activities can be expected to be
 
given a national security support role. This role
 
requires new agencies to formulate Informatbn' security
 
classification programs. The assignment of a security
 
classification has the effect of taking the information
 
out of the open literature and limiting the persons who
 
can have access to it. A conflict is established between
 
national security objectives on the one hand and progress
, 

through open communication. It is the objective of this
 
thesis to identify this problem in detail, explore its
 
background and examine factors and approaches that should
 
be considered in establishing classification policies
 
in new science organizations.
 
Examination of this problem was conducted through
 
a combination of several research activities, The
 
vi
 
statements of scientists from various disciplines who
 
have previously been involved in classification of research
 
information were examined In order to identify the
 
reasons for their frustrations, objections and difficulties
 
with classification practices. An analysis was conducted
 
of the legal and situational environment in which the
 
conflict between science and secrecy takes place through
 
an examination of public laws, executive orders, federal
 
court decisions , etc. An analysis was made of sound
 
approaches and practices that are germane to establishment
 
of a realistic classification program within the
 
confines 6f the government's current policies. An
 
examination was also conducted to identify aneas of
 
potential research that could lead to fundamental
 
improvement in the classification management p.rogramo
 
Some of the objections to secrecy from a portion
 
of the scientific community result from fundamental
 
disagreement toward any form of limitation on research
 
information, To this group, only a major modification
 
of current executive orders and laws will bring any
 
relief, Many of the objections and frustrations of the
 
scientists, however g are aimed toward classification
 
practices, Refined and Improved practices can be
 
developed and approaches leading to these practices
 
are analyzed in the thesis, Through these approaches,
 
many of the conflicts between science and secrecy can
 
be minimized,
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Ti tie 
Science vs. Sec-recy in Governmental Agencies - The 
Problem and Some Approaches for Minimizing the Conflict 
. The Problem , 
Since World War II scientific'and technological 
advances in the United States have been paralleled by 
greater government involvement in managing new scientific 
programs that can capitalize on these developments. 
The establishment of new organizations and redirection 
of existing ones to manage new science programs of the 
future can be anticipated. Most new science organizations 
will not be primarily aimed toward national defense, 
objectives. However, on the basis of past experience, 
most of these new organizations can be expected to be 
given a national security support role. 
This support role will require new agencies to 
formulate information security classification philosophies 
and programs under the provisions of Executive Order 10501 
Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests. of the 
2
 
Defense of the-Unlted States (as amended).'
 
The assignment of a security classification to Infor­
mation has the effect of taking the information out of
 
the open literature and limiting the persons who can have
 
access to it. A conflict is therefore established between
 
national security objectives on the one hand, and progress
 
through completely open communication of information, on
 
the other hand. A delicate balance must be struck between
 
these two Important considerations, and an organization's
 
class ification program is the arena In which these Interests
 
compete. The scientists strive toward complete freedom
 
of information while the government's national security
 
program pulls in. the other direction.
 
In this environment, newly created agencies must
 
establish a realistic and sound Information security
 
classification philosophy and policy by which, their future
 
information release and restriction practices can be
 
charted.
 
It will be the objective of this thesis to identify
 
the problem In detail, explore its background and examine
 
factors and approaches that should be considered in the
 
establishment of security classification policies and
 
IU. S., President, Safecuardinq Offcial' Information
 
in the Interests of the Defense of theUnited States,
 
Executive Order 10501, 18 F. R. 7049, Nov. 10, 1953, as
 
amended by E. 0. 10816, 24 F. R. 3777, May 12, 1959; E. 0.
 
10901, 26 F. R. 217, Jan. 12, 1961; E. 0. 10964, 26 F. R.
 
8932, Sept. 22, 1961; E. 0. 10985, 27 F. R. 439, Jan. 16,
 
1962; E. 0. 11097, 28 F. R. 2225, Mar. 7, 1963; and E. 0.
 
11382, April 1, 1967.
 
practices in newly created science organizations facing
 
this problem.
 
Assumptions
 
This thesis has been written primarily with the view
 
toward providing insight and aid to government executives
 
in newly created science organizations who are responsible
 
for Initiating and developing agency Information classifi­
cation policy and practices. The last chapter In this
 
thesis analyzes further research that is needed to be
 
conducted by government officials and others Interested
 
in classification program improvement. This thesis
 
assumes that the reader has a general familiarization
 
with the public laws and executive orders that have a
 
bearing on this subject as well as the related terminology.
 
It assumes that If the reader has had a priqr working
 
background In science management, that it has not included
 
a policy making responsibility In the field analyzed in
 
this thesis. The reader who is Interested in-examining,
 
in detail, the legal basis which forms the environment
 
forthis analysis will find the appropriate references
 
in the footnotes.
 
On the basis of past experience and a preliminary
 
view of this subject the writer has established two
 
assumptions that have been used to further guide develop­
ment of this thesis.
 
1. Requirements for assignment of security classi­
fication to research information having prospective
 
value to national defense interests will probably be
 
continued. Classification precipitates a conflict for
 
scientists between national security interests and an
 
open exchange of information. The major difficulties
 
underlying the conflicts between science and secrecy
 
result from the application of certain procedures and
 
practices. Realistic approaches and improved procedures
 
can alleviate much of this conflict.
 
2. Significant lessons and guidance can be gained
 
from the past experience of some government organizations
 
to aid new science agencies in development of realistic
 
and sound Information security classification programs,
 
within the framework of existing conditions.
 
This thesis examines the background, Issues, problems
 
and environment involved in security classification of:
 
1. 	Scientific research (basic and developmental)
 
information rather than operational data.
 
2. 	 Information developed in the physical sciences
 
rather than the social sciences.
 
3. 	Information originated in the interests of
 
national security, but not to Include information
 
having an immediate military value.
 
These purposeful limitations In scope were needed in
 
order to keep this analysis within realistic bounds of
 
time and space. It should be recognized that this Is a
 
5
 
limited study and therefore, by no means, an exhaustive
 
analysis of the overall subject of security classification.
 
Research Desion
 
A preliminary research step involved an analysis of
 
evaluations and statements made by a variety of scientists
 
and science-administrators representing various disciplines
 
in order to identify the major objections,dlfficultles
 
and frustrations that are encountered In dealing wit'h
 
the Government's security classification program,
 
This is followed by an analysis of the Government's
 
current security classification program as it affects
 
science agencies. Definitions of key words which, in
 
the past, have caused some communications difficulty and
 
misunderstanding are included in this section.
 
Then, an examination is made of the recently passed
 
"Freedom of Information" law 2 and its impact on the
 
security classification system in existing and new
 
government science organizations.
 
In order to give a broader perspective to this
 
study, a brief comparative analysis is made of security
 
classification programs in other countrdes.
 
This is followed by an analysis of realistic and
 
sound approaches and practices that are germane to
 
2U. S., Congress, Senate, Amendment to the' Admlnistra­
"tive Procedure Act, Public Law 89-487, 89th Cong., I160,
 
July 4, 1966, which amended Section 3 of the Administrative
 
Procedures Act of June 11, 1946 (60 Stat. 238).
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establishment of a security classification program in a
 
newly created science agency, within the confines of the
 
government's current policies. This section was developed
 
on the basis of analysis of the data obtained in the
 
earlier examinations and additional information pertinent 
to this study. 
Finally, an examination has been conducted to identify 
and describe additional areas of potential research that
 
could lead to fundamental improvement In the classification
 
management program. This chapter includes suggestions
 
concerning approaches that should be considered in further
 
research of this subject.
 
Research Methodology and Sources
 
The preceding section dealt primarily with a
 
description of the general design used in development
 
'of this thesis. This section concentrates oq a description
 
of methods, techniques, procedures and sources,
 
Examination of this problem has been conducted
 
through a combination of several research activities.
 
Research was initiated by identifying the non-military
 
organizations within the executive branch of the Government
 
which have been given authority to initiate security
 
classification assignments to information which they
 
develop. The pertinent executive order (EO 10501) was
 
used as the source of this information.
 
An examination followed of the summary statements of
 
7 
3 
responsibilities of these organizations, as listed In
 
the current United States Government Organization Manual
 
for the purpose of identifying those activities which
 
have a scientific research function. This screening was
 
necessary because of the writer's Intention of -limiting
 
the range of this study to the intended scope.
 
The purpose of the above actions was intended to
 
lead up to the next step, which was to direct a written
 
communication to these organizations in Washington, D. C.,
 
to inquire into specific aspects of each agency's classifi­
cation program. 
A parallel effort was to seek out statements and 
evaluations made by scientists about the nation's security 
classification program. The purpose of this portion of
 
the research was to enable a direct examination of precise
 
problems as viewed by the specific category of persons
 
whose cooperation is a vital preliminary to a successful
 
classification program. Journal and magazine indexes
 
were searched to identify sources of this Information.
 
The Journals printed over the past five years by the
 
National Classification Management Society were analyzed.
 
Other periodicals dealing with the nation's security
 
program such as the "Industrial Security Magazine" and
 
"Security World" were also reviewed. Detailed development
 
3General Services Administration* United States
 
Government Or anizatlon Manual 1969-1970 (Washington,
 
D. ,: Government Printing Office, 196)
 
8
 
of this chapter was essential to a meaningful analysis
 
of this subject.
 
Next, there was conducted an examination of the
 
legal and situational environment in which the conflict
 
between science and the Government's national security
 
program takes place. This analysis Included an examination
 
of pertinent public laws, executive orders, related
 
federal court decisions, etc. Included was an examination
 
of the "Freedom of Information" Law.
 
Research was then done into comparative classification
 
systems for the purpose of gaining a broader insight
 
into classification practices in other countries in the
 
field of scientlfic research Information.
 
The next portion of the thesis consists, primarily
 
of a review of the data collected and an analysis of the
 
factors and approaches of potential usefulness and
 
reference for new science agencies.
 
This thesis concentrates on the subject of establishing
 
a realistic Information classification program for research
 
information in newly created Government science organiza­
tions, whose activities are not primarily directed toward
 
national defense. However, some of the research conducted
 
for this effort Involves obtaining viewpoints and analyzing
 
practices of defense oriented organizations as well as
 
examining the classification environment of these activities.
 
This is considered necessary because of the' relatively
 
greater experience of these organizations wlth classification
 
problems, and it is considered realistic because the
 
scientists and science administrators in these organizations
 
face the same basic classification problems as do their
 
counterparts in those existing and emerging organizations,
 
whose activities are not primarily directed toward
 
national defense.
 
The terms "department" and "agency" are used Inter­
changeably in this thesis and both refer to major organiza­
tional elements in the Executive Branch of the United 
States Government, 
PART ONE:
 
FACTORS BEARING ON THE
 
CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE
 
AND SECRECY
 
CHAPTER II
 
SCIENCE CHALLENGES SECRECY
 
This chapter provides an introduction and perspective 
to the conflict between science and classification through 
an examination of statements and evaluations of a number 
of sci-entists and science administrators. These views 
range from urging a complete abandonment of classification 
of scientific research information to a more moderate 
position suggesting a critical review of the nation's 
classification program, with a view toward general 
liberalization and lessening of control over research
 
information.
 
Dr, B. D. Van Evera, Dean for Sponsored Research, 
The George Washington University, summarized the opinion 
of a large number of scientists who represent the extreme 
on one end of this opinion continuum: 
There are many scientists who feel that 
if no research were classified and if it
 
were all open for discussion, our rate of
 
progress would be sufficiently greater to
 
overcome any loss that we might suffr from
 
news of this research leaking. . . .
 
The scientists who take this position generally grant
 
4B. D. Van Evera, "Universities, Research and 
Security," Industrial Security, 7:1 (January, 1963), p. 32. 
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that there is a value to the nation's security interests
 
of classification of selected Information, but that on
 
overall balance, the classification program results in
 
delay to the advancement of research and that, therefore,
 
the entire classification program should be discontinued.
 
In the university context, Van Evera is even more definite:
 
The issue of Academic Freedom has been
 
fought for decades, and like all fights for
 
freedom continues unceasingly on. The absolute
 
need for a research man to study all phases
 
of a problem, to discuss his own and others'
 
ideas and concepts without restrictions and
 
with any intelligent person who is inte ested
 
is understood by. all who know research?
 
C. P. Snow, in his epic essay, "Science and Government,"
 
cited specific examples of instances wherein'security
 
restri'ctions have not impeded the discovery of new Ideas
 
by others, but have only succeeded in hampering our
 
country's own efforts. He also deplored the adverse
 
effect that working on classified projects has on the
 
people engaged in these activities:
 
The euphoria of secrecy goes to the head
 
very much like the euphoria of gadgets, I
 
have known men, prudent in other respects,
 
who become drunk with it. It induces an
 
unbalancing sense of power. It is not of
 
consequence whether one is hugging to oneself
 
a secret about one's own side, or about the
 
other. It is not uncommon to run across men,
 
superficially commonplace and unextravagant,
 
who are letting their judgment run wild
 
because they are hoarding a secret about
 
the other side . . . quite forgetting that
 
,someone on'the other side, almost indis­
tinguishable from themselves, is hoarding
 
5 1bd., p. 22.
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a precisely similar secret about them. It
 
takes a very strong head to keep secrets for
 
years, and not go slightly mad. It isn't 6
 
wise to be advised by anyone slightly mad.
 
John R. Borchert, University of Minnesota and chairman
 
of the Earth Sciences Division, National Research Council,
 
delivered a paper on "Remote Sensors and Geographical
 
Science" 7 at the Fifth Annual Symposium on Remote Sensing
 
of the Environment held at the University of Michigan,
 
April 18, 1968. in his paper he made reference to some
 
practical difficulties that security classification of
 
remote sensors were creating in the scientific community,
 
particularly with reference to the free flow of information
 
and international cooperation.
 
Sidney Fernbach, a theoretical physicist at the
 
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, kivermore, California,
 
described a personnel management problem resulting from
 
the practice of classified research:
 
At the laboratory I have been involved In hiring
 
and working with scientists, and very often
 
it comes to one's attention that they dislike
 
to work in classified areas. Almost every
 
one of them refused to work in a classified
 
area if he can find some way in getting out
 
of it. Very'.6ften it's the unavailability of
 
an academic position or perhaps more dollars
 
involved that makes him take a position that
 
does Involve some kind of security classification.
 
Even then he tries to avoid the classified
 
6 Charles P. Snow, Science and Government (New York:
 
The New American Library, 1960), p. 65.
 
7john R. Borchert, "Remote Sensors and Geographical
 
Science," as quoted in National Classification Management
 
Society Bulletin, May/June, 1969, p. 5.
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work, and sort of seeks the continuation of
 
the dissertation, and finds any number of
 
t-lcks to keep in the pure physics or pure
 
science realm. The reason for doing this
 
is that you can still communicate with the
 
outside world in pure science. There are
 
many journals and publications, lie publishes
 
articles, and keeps in touch with what other
 
people are doing in a similar field. Even
 
though there is so much being published in
 
the world, he finds that in the classified
 
area this contact no longer is available
 
to him, and he misses it. Fie loses the chance
 
to invent new ideas, or at least he thinks 
he does. Far more progress is actually 
evidenced in the unclassified fields of 
research than in the classified ones. And
 
much of this is due to te freedom to discuss
 
and publish information.
 
He then went on to discuss the difficulty that scientists
 
encounter in attempting to retrieve unclassified informtion
 
from classified reports:
 
Another difficulty the man finds is that
 
declassification of documents becomes very
 
difficult. At present the law has been changed
 
so that it's possible to declassifysom,
 
documents after a given period of time,,and
 
others are scrutinized by a group of people
 
more frequently thanrin the past. But it is
 
not always the proper material that is declas­
sified as far as the scientist is concerned.
 
Sometimes you find that a small item buried
 
in a classified report is of great importance
 
and this tem Is lost in the classified
 
document.
 
Fernbach's evaluations of the unfavorable impact of
 
classification on work effort, however, is not necessarily
 
shared by all evaluators of 'the classification program.
 
8Sidney Fernbach, "Panel--Science and Technology, 
and Classification Management," National Classification 
Management Society Journal, Vol. 11, 1966, pp. 48-49. 
9 Ibid.0 p. 49.
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Dr. Louis Smith. a chemist at the Los Alamos Scientific
 
Laboratory expressed his view as follows:
 
I feel that classification is only a minor
 
perturbation to a person's productivity. My
 
experience has been that a productive person
 
will be productive no matter what he is doing.
 
It is possible, of course, to make life so
 
tough for him that he will go somewhere else
 
if he has to, to be productive, but it is not
 
likely to be classification per se that gets
 
in his way, It Is more likely to be money
 
for equipment or'putting him to work on some
 
project which doesn't look worthwhile to him 
in the first place. . . . The productive 
person will overcome any reasonable number
 
of handicaps. He is going to take joy in doing
 
a good job and, whether It is classified work
 
or unclassified work, as long as he is happy
 
with what he is doing that is all that is
 
required.10
 
Van' Evera brought out the idea that research depends
 
on a free cross fertilization of ideas to reach its
 
maximum potentials. He cited an interesting example
 
from his own experience:
 
Research is primarily a matter of ideas.
 
We do not know how ideas get into one's mind,
 
but we doknow that discussion with kindred
 
minds promotes the development of ideas.
 
And very frequently ideas from one area of
 
knowledge may have application in a quite
 
different area. For example, in the mrd-­
nineteen fifties, the George Washington Univer­
sity was doing research at Fort Detrick on
 
the explosive dissemination of liquids. One
 
of the items of equipment that had to be
 
developed was a high speed camera, shuttered
 
by a prism rotating at high speed. To get
 
information on how to rotate a prism at the
 
high rate necessary we went to a scientist
 
1OLouls Smith, "Panel: In the Looking Glass (The
 
Impact of Classification on Research)," Seminar: Classi­
fication Managemenft at the Working Level*, sponsored by
 
the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the National Classification
 
Management Society, February, 1970, p. 25,
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who was studying proteins. In his research,
 
he used ultra centrifuges, which do rotate
 
at high speed, and so was able to give us
 
substantial help. There Is no obvious reason to
 
suspect there could be any contribution from
 
protein researfl to studies using explosives,
 
but there was.
 
Ed Price, the 1967-1968 Vice President for Technical
 
Activities of AIAA, published a lengthy article on the
 
view that the penalties of restriction of dissemination
 
of scientific information are greater than usually
 
supposed, and that recent restrictions of unclassified
 
information to foreign nationals are doing the country
 
more harm than good because they impede effective use
 
of the information by the U. S. In describing the present
 
classification system, Mr. Price wrotet
 
The system produces a morass of practical
 
problems; such as cost of security controls,
 
cost of dissemination, attainment of consistent
 
levels of restriction, and assurance of an
 
effective level of dissemination. Unambiguous
 
specification of policy is exceedingly difficult
 
moreover, in the face of the complex and sub­
jective value judgments that are required; and
 
inconsistent implementation of ambiguous,
 
time-varying policy constitutes a perpetual
 
source of confusion and frustration. These
 
problems are not susceptible to any obvious
 
solution other than patience and persistence,
 
plus a thorough understanding of the negative
 
and positive aspects of embracing a clasl!fied
 
-dissemination system in the first place.
 
Robert Lindsey, a newspaperman with the San-Jose
 
"Mercury News" expressed an observation sometimes made by
 
I1 Van Evera, p. 32.
 
12 Ed Price as quoted in National Classification
 
Management Society Bulletin, May/June, 1969, p. 5.
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scientists and engineers who are expected to make some
 
of the more difficult classification determinations in
 
the course of their work on projects that involve
 
classified information. Lindsey noted that there is an
 
essential need for much greater interchange of information
 
between officials responsible for classification management
 
and representatives of the nation's intelligence organiza­
tions:
 
It seems to me that there should be more 
coordination between the people in your 
[classification management] profession and 
those in the intelligence community - although 
I would speculate the intelligence jjople 
are not all that easy to work with.
 
Robert Battey, Aerospace Engineer at NASA's Manned
 
Spacecraft Center, provides additional insight into
 
this problem. Battey noted that classification standards
 
frequently are based on whether a particular technological
 
development represents a significant and unexpected
 
advancement in the state-of-the-art or is merely a
 
result of an obvious or logical extension of the state'
 
of-the-art. This distinction is frequently the basis
 
on which a decision is required to be made as to whether
 
related information is to be classified or not classified.
 
According to Battey, a technical decision in this regard
 
can ordinarily be made insofar as the status of U. S.
 
13 Robert Lindsey, "The Other Side of the Coin," 
National Classification Management Society Journal, IV:2, 
1960, p. 17. 
technological development is concerned if the development
 
is recognized as a significant advancement. However, he
 
noted that knowledge about the developmental status of
 
similar technical disciplines in other countries is not
 
readily available; therefore, the accuracy of classification
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suffer accordingly.
determinations 

On May 14, 1969, Dr. Edward Teller testified before
 
a Senate Subcommittee on the information gap concerning
 
the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) controversy and debate.
 
In referring to the impact of secrecy on discussion of
 
matters of vital national interest, Teller acknowledged
 
that to-open the book of secrets both to the Congress
 
and to the public will have the disadvantage of giving
 
help to our adversaries. ' But, he said:
 
I believe that our whole policy of secrecy
 
should be carefully reviewed and that far
 
reaching decisions should be made to encourage
 
open discussion. Secrecy has produced the
 
information gap which impedes ojjerly

"
 9
discussion of the ABM question.
 
Teller made the following general recommendation: "Our
 
rules of secrecy should be rediscussed and made more
 
,1
liberal .
 
Dr. John Foster, Director of the Department of
 
Defense Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering,
 
141nterview with Robert Battey, Aerospace Engineer,
 
on March 11, 1970.
 
15 Edward Teller as quoted in National Classification
 
Management Society Bulletin, May/June, 1969, supplement p. 2.
 
161b id.
 
in recent testimony before another Senate Committee
 
concerning the nation's classification policy said:
 
The basic dilemma in these decisions is, on
 
the one hand, to encourage the maximum inter­
change of technical information within the
 
scientific and technical community of the
 
Free World for our own benefit and yet, on
 
the other hand, to minimize any free technical
 
assistance to countries 1 hose Interests may
 
not coincide with ours.
 
He added later in the same testimony:
 
You must understand that the U. S. Technical
 
Community depends heavily and thrives upon
 
the processes of open debate. Without debate
 
in most critical areas of defense R&D, our
 
current technical superiority would be
 
jeopardized, just as surely as it would be
 
if classified information were compromised. 18
 
The inevitable conflict between science and classifi­
cation was well expressed by Dr. Leslie M. Redman, Technical
 
Information Group Leader at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
 
in New Mexico. He said in substance.
 
The basic point in any discussion of science
 
and technology and classification management
 
is that a balance must be struck between defense
 
and progress, because there is an unequivocal
 
and unresolvable conflict between them. The
 
morality of interfering with free dissemination
 
of scientific information is not usually dis­
cussed. It seems to be an ignored fundamental
 
of the essential conflict between science
 
and classification. We are standing in our
 
own way, in a deliberate and, we hope, measured­
way when we try to apply class ific ion
 
management to science information.
 
17John Foster as quoted in National Classification
 
Management Society Bulldtin, May/June, 1969, p. 3.
 
181i
Id.e 

19Leslie M. Redman, "Panel--Science and Technology,
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The university environment causes some very special
 
problems to a researcher attempting to conduct work on
 
a classified contract. Dr. Richard C. Dove, Dean of the
 
Engineering Department at the University of New Mexico,
 
described some of these difficulties:
 
Except for some of the very large universities ­
at a lab like the Lincoln Laboratory - a uni­
versity professor, once he takes on a classified 
project, may very well find himself the only 
man there working on that project. That, 
you see, is a very special atmosphere. So 
it does limit the freedom of exchange of 
information which a researcher needs to do his 
work. The other handicap, of course, involves 
the use of students. At most universities, 
in fact I would hope at all universities, 
research is chosen so it does involve students 
and becomes a vehicle for continuing the 
education of those students. As soon as you 
take on classified research then you have the 
problem of getting the students cleared so 
that they, in turn, can have the sources of 
information necessairy to do that particul'ar 
research. As soon as a student becomes in­
volved in classified research, knowing full 
well that he intends to write either a Master's
 
thesis or a Doctor's dissertation, then you
 
have the problem of finding committee members
 
who can be cleared so they can approve his work
 
and you have the battle of whether or not It is
 
legitimate at that university, to present a
 
thesis or dissertation which is not then
 
publishable in26 he wider literature because it
 
is classified.
 
The difficult balance between science and classification
 
has its roots in the Preamble to the Constitution of the
 
United' States according to a professional engineer, Frank
 
and Classification Management," National Classification
 
Management Society Journal, Vol. 'it 96b, pp. 38-39.
 
2 0 Richard C. Dove, "Classified Research in the Univer­
sity," Seminar: Classification Management at the Working
 
Level, p. 20.
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Thomas. In an address concerning classification and
 
technological breakthroughs, he made the following
 
observations:
 
First try to consider and to outline
 
the national object ives or national goals 
in the broadest possible terms. . . . For 
purposes of illustration let me examine briefly 
the national goals as outlined in the Preamble 
to the Constitution. If you will permit a 
certain editorial license these goals are: 
1, Form a more perfect union; 2, establish
 
justice; 3, insure domestic tranquility;
 
4, provide for the common defense; 5, promote
 
the general welfare; and 6, secure liberty.
 
If one accepts that the national goal
 
is (in our technical jargon) to optimize or
 
maximize these six individual goals, then
 
it simply cannot be done. Assume for a moment
 
that we could quantify these goals, and remove
 
the largely unknowable factors of complex
 
,human behavior. Even then, we could not
 
simultaneously maximize all six goals. We
 
could not maximize any two goals, Even with
 
our simplifying assumption, mathematically
 
we would be able to maximize only one of the
 
1
parameters or one of the goals for an given
 
situation or set of input conditions.
 
Thomas went on to point out that it is impossible to
 
simultaneously achieve maximum defense (goal 4 in the
 
above quote) and maximum welfare (goal 5) or maximum
 
liberty (goal 6). He went on to say:
 
The framers of our Constitution, of course,
 
realized the necessity of arriving at a balance
 
between possibly conflicting national goals.
 
* . . in the broadest sense, any policy
 
instituted by the government, including the
 
classification policy, cannot consider only
 
a single national goal. Unless we are
 
2 1Frank Thomas, "Classification and Technological
 
Breakthroughs," National Qlasslficatlon Management Society,
 
Journal, Vol. 11, 119;b pp. 12-13o
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willing to forego all goals, except one, the
 
policy must consider the other goals and make
 
at least some attempt to2 2 esolve conflict
 
between competing goals.
 
In summary, administrators of science programs,
 
both in and out of Government are generally unanimous
 
and quite outspoken in their position that security
 
classification of research Information constitutes a
 
definite hindrance to a maximum development of science
 
in our country.
 
They have cited numerous difficulties that have,
 
in their evaluation, been caused or enlarged by the
 
Government's classification program including such
 
problems as personnel assignment and retention troubles;
 
a hampering of desired international cooperative programs;
 
the loss of unclassified data to the scientific community
 
because of the difficulty of retrieving it from classified
 
documentation; the impediment of a free flow of needed
 
information among diverse disciplines where the value
 
of interdisciplinary contributions cannot always be
 
anticipated but frequently exist; and the difficulties
 
and related increases in costs because of ambiguous
 
and sometimes inconsistent classification specifications.
 
2 2 b'i'd., 
 p. 13.
 
CHAPTER III
 
THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROGRAhl
 
An examination of the legal, situational and compcrative
 
environment, in which the conflict between science and
 
the Government's security program takes place, is necessary
 
in order to provide a background for a later analysis
 
of approaches that can be dsed to minimize the conflict.
 
An explanation of the reasons for science organizations
 
being involved, at all, in research that becomes classified
 
is a realistic starting point for this inquiry.
 
Therefore, this chapter covers an analysis of the
 
U. S. Government information security classification
 
program and its effect on science agencies.
 
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United
 
States established the concept that provisions would be
 
made "for the common defense." Article 11, Section I
 
of the Constitution states In part "The executive Power
 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of
 
America."
 
In spite of the fact that Congress has historically
 
championed the cause of a free flow of information, our
 
legislative body has initiated many laws which have had
 
the effect of encouraging administrative action to withhold
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information. In terms of-the gross number of legislative
 
actions, the tally is as follows:
 
A variety of statutes have been enacted which
 
underwrite secrecy throughout the executive
 
branch, while other laws protect segments of
 
information lodged within the jurisdiction of
 
particular agencies. In 1960 the House Sub­
committee on Government Information listed
 
172 statutes which permit government infor­
mation to be withheld from the public, as
 
compared with 75 statutes which specificall 3
 
require the dissemination of official data. 3
 
Ultimately, however, the power to withhold information
 
from the public domain stems from the power of the chief
 
executive.
 
Beyond the general constitutional provisions and
 
the various statutes, Executive Order 10501,24 as amended,
 
which directs the assignment of a security classification
 
to infotmation in the interests of the. defense of the
 
United States, authorizes and directs specific Government 
organizations to take classification actions. It currently 
reflects that in the following "having primary responsibility 
for matters pertaining to national defense . . . the 
authority for original classification ofinformation or 
material . . . may be exercised by the head . . . or by 
such responsible officers or employees as he, or his
 
representative may designate for that purpose:"
 
2 3Francis 
E. Rourke, Security and Publicity -
Dilemmas of Demdcracy (Baltimore, 14d.: The John Hopkins 
Pres's', 19b) , p. 57, 
zksafequardlng 	Official Information .,'. .,, Exec.
 
105014
Orde r 
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The White House Office
 
President's Science Advisory Committee
 
Bureau of the Budget
 
Council of Economic Advisors
 
National Security Council
 
Central Intelligence Agency
 
Department of State
 
Department of the Treasury
 
Department of Defense
 
Department of the Army
 
Department of the Air Force
 
Department of Justice
 
Department of Commerce
 
Department of Labor
 
Department of Transportation
 
Atomic Energy Commission
 
Canal Zone Government
 
Federal Communications Commission
 
Federal Radiation Council
 
General Services Administration
 
Interstate Commerce Commission
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
National Aeronautics and Space Council
 
United States Civil Service Commission
 
United States Information Agency
 
Agency for International Development
 
Office of Emergency Planning
 
Peace Corps
 
President's Foreign Intelligence Board
 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 
Export-import Bank of Washington
 
Office of Science and Technology
 
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
 
In addition to the above, the heads of the following
 
Government departments and agencies are also authorized
 
(without provisions for further delegation to subordinates)
 
to classify information by EO 10501:
 
Post Office Department
 
Department of the Interior
 
Department of Agriculture
 
Department of Health, Education) and Welfare
 
Civil Aeronautics Board
 
Federal Maritime Commission
 
Federal Power Commission
 
National Science Foundation
 
Panama Canal Company
 
Renegotiation Board
 
Small Business Administration
 
Tennessee Valley Authority
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Executive Order 10501 established a comprehensive
 
system of information classification to preclude access
 
to data that could be beneficial to potential adversaries
 
of the United States. In modifying a prior executive
 
order, it was designed to reduce the number of agencies
 
which could Initiate classified material, eliminate the
 
category of "restricted" information and establish
 
declassification procedures for information that did not
 
warrant further protection.
 
However, in spite of the above objectives, a careful
 
examination of the list of organizations cited above
 
indicates that most are outside of the formal defense
 
establishment. Even by Including for the purpose of this
 
discussion in the "defense establishment," organizations
 
such as CIA, AEC, the National Security Council and the
 
others who have a major role in defense related activities,
 
there still is a majority of the organizations listed
 
that are not generally thought to have a military or
 
defense role.
 
It has been observed- that many people, in and out
 
of the government, are under the impression that information
 
should legitimately be classified only by military and
 
related defense organizations. Examination of the
 
"purposes" of many organizations as they are described
 
in the current issue of the Government Organization
 
Manual would support the misconception that only the
 
defense oriented agencies are legitimately involved In
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the classification of information. For example, the
 
Government Orcanlzation Manual, in defining the najor
 
purposes of the following departments, all of which are
 
domestic organizations and have a substantial research
 
and development role according to Amitai Etzionl, 2 5
 
contains no reference to support of national security
 
objectives by these organizations:
 
Department of Commerce
 
Department of Labor
 
Department of Transportation
 
Department of Agriculture
 
Department of the Interior
 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
 
Similarly, for NASA and the Federal Aviation Admini­
stration, both of which have a substantial research and
 
development function, there is also no reference in the
 
Government Oroanization Manual indicating a national
 
security support role for these organizations.
 
Yet, all of the above activities are described in
 
EO 10501 as being organizations Uhaving primary responsi­
bility for matters pertaining to national defense."
 
The question that quite naturally arises is: If
 
such organizations do not have major national security
 
support responsibilities, why are they described in
 
EO 10501 as having a primary responsibility for matters
 
pertaining to national defense?
 
2 5Amitai Etzioni, "Agency for Technological Development
 
for Domestic Programs," Sci'ence, April 4, 1969, pp.
 
43-50.
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Part of the answer to this question is found In an
 
examination of the legislation under which such agencies
 
are established or in subsequent laws or interagency
 
agreements further defining the roles of existing
 
organizations. For example, the "Space Act" provides
 
in its Section 101 that
 
aeronautical and space activities of the
 
United States shall be conducted so as to
 
contribute materially to one or more of the
 
following objectives: . . . The making available 
to agencies directly concerned with national 
defense of discoveries that have military 
value or significance. 
Section 303 of the Space Act directs tha't the
 
Information obtained or developed by the
 
Administrator in the performance of his functions
 
under this Act shall be made available for public
 
inspection, except (A) information authorized
 
or required by Federal statute to be withheld
 
and (B) information classified to protect
 
the national security.
 
Section 304 of the Space Act authorizes the Administrator to
 
"establish such security requirements restrictions, and
 
safeguards as he deems necessary in the interests of national
 
''26
securrty.. As noted by Rourke in his earlier quotation
 
there are many statutes covering classification of
 
information by executive branch agencies,
 
Another part of the explanation for the involvement
 
of seemingly non-defense organizations In the role of
 
"having primary responsibility for matters pertaining to
 
26 U. S., Congress, House,' Nartional Aeronautics and
 
Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568, 85th Cons., H.-R.
 
12575, July 29, 1958.
 
-Space 
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national defense" is found in the very definition of
 
"1national defense."
 
The executive order, itself, provides no specific
 
definition of the term "national defense." Yet it does
 
provide us with a clue in the section on classification
 
categories by referring to "defense information, including
 
military information" and thus making it clear that there
 
is another category of 'defense information aside from
 
military information.
 
One agency's policy statement on security classifi­
cation criteria and guidelines provides a further under­
standing of the term:
 
A Presidential Directive of September 23,
 
1958, among other things, establishes that the
 
term "classified defense information" includes
 
both "classified military information" and
 
"classified nonmilitary defense Information." 27
 
A broad interpretation of national defense as it
 
applies to the classification of information was recently
 
voiced by a DOD Classification Management Official in
 
the following statement:
 
The "government purpose" for which access
 
to classified information is claimed to be
 
necessary, should be related in some way to
 
the interests of national defense. The needs
 
of the government are so broad, however, that
 
this connection often may be somewhat remote.
 
It is axiomatic that the strength of the
 
U. S. Government and the nation in all fields
 
is related to its strength in the international
 
2 7National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
Security Classification Program Criteria and Guidelines,
 
NHB 1640.4A, July 1967, p. 4.
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arena; therefore, all activities affecting
 
the strength of the Government and the na on
 
affect the interests of national defense.
 
In this same statement, this official also earlier said:
 
In one way or another, practically every
 
agency in the Executive Branch participates
 
at some time in activities affecting or
 
relating to national defense.zj
 
The Congress provided yet another descriptive term
 
to describe this role of a non-military organization
 
involved in defense support activity. The Space Act
 
required NASA "to provide for the widest practicable and
 
appropriate dissemination of information concerning its
 
activities and the results thereof." In the same
 
enactment, the Congress provided for the withholding
 
from public inspection of "Information classified to
 
protect the national security." 3 0  (underlining added). 
Thus the term "national security" Is considered
 
analogous to "national defense," and these two terms
 
envision both military and non-military interests and
 
information in the context of Classification Management.
 
This has significant implications for science agencies
 
because any Federal agency listed in EQ 10501 has a
 
responsibility for identification and protection of
 
28C. Donald Garrett, "The Role of Need-To-Know in
 
Releasing Classified Information," Defense: Industry
 
Bulletin, February, 1'969, p. 3.
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3 0 National Aeronautics and Space 'Act -of 195.8.
 
information affecting the defense or security of the
 
nation,
 
The non-military, defense interests of our country
 
are defined in the following quotation by Howard Maines
 
who provides a description of the reasons and the justi­
fications for imposing some degree of protection on new
 
technological developments:
 
First, whenever a new material, device,
 
manufacturing process, or operational pro­
cedure can be applied to give us a military
 
advantage, it is certainly in the national
 
interest to protect that advantage for as long
 
as we can. . . . Second, we want to maintain 
an industrial lead over our competitors in 
the world market, Only by producing superior 
products at competitive prices can we sell 
enough goods abroad to balance the outflow of 
gold required to support our economic and 
military commitments around the world . . . 
Third, in the less obvious, and perhaps intangible 
political area, the classification and
 
controlled disclosure of some of our more
 
advanced technologies, provide our government
 
. ...
with a valuable Instrument of diplomacy 31
 
EO 10501 provides extremely broad and gene'ral guidelines
 
to non-military agencies for classification of information.
 
In defining 'Confidential' information, for example, the
 
order provides merely that "Except as may be expressly
 
provided by statute, the use of the classification
 
'Confidential' shall be authorized, by appropriate
 
authority, only for defense information or material the
 
unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to
 
31howard G. Maines, "Panel--Government Classification
 
Management Policies and Programs," National Classification
 
Management Society Journal, Vol. II, 19660 pp. 82-83.
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the defense interests of the nation." The provision
 
for classification of 'Secret' information offers only
 
slightly more guidance. Several examples of kinds of
 
information are cited which require classification at
 
the 'Secret' level. But all of these examples except
 
one are of interest only to military orbanizations. That
 
single phrase that provides guidance to science oriented
 
organizations is the provision for classification at
 
the 'Secret' level of "scientific or technological
 
developments important to national defense."
 
Thus, It is clear that science agencies must establish
 
classification policy on the basis of very negligible
 
formal guidance because of the extremely limJted and
 
very general government-wide policy terminology found
 
In EO 10501. It seems obvious that an agency must
 
provide its researchers with more concrete classification
 
guidance than the very brief statement to clsslfy
 
"developments important to national defense." Science
 
agencies will need to rely on informal means of acquiring
 
policy guidance direction such as drawing on the prior
 
experience of other organizations. At the same time
 
they will also want to develop their own unique approaches
 
to classification of the particular categories of research
 
information with which they are dealing.
 
CHAPTER IV
 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW
 
Recent legislative action in the form of Public
 
Law 89-487, 89th Congress, commonly referred to as the
 
"F.reedom of Information Law" now provides additional
 
direction to Government agencies in connection with
 
release and withholding of information.
 
It provides that all Government information, except
 
that which has been specifically excepted as provided
 
in the law, be made available upon request to the public.
 
In signing this legislation, which revised the public
 
Information provisions of the Administrative Procedure
 
Act, on July 4, 1966, President Johnson, In part, stated:
 
This legislation springs from one of
 
our most essential principles: a democracy
 
works best when the people have all the
 
information that the security of the Nation per­
:mIt& No one should be able to pull curtains
 
of secrecy around decisions which can be re-,
 
vealed without injury to the public 'interest.
 
At the same time, the welfare of the nation
 
or the rights of individuals may require that
 
some documents not be made available . . .
 
I know that the sponsors of this bill recog­
nize these important interests and intend
 
to provide for'both the need of the public
 
for access to information and the need of
 
the Government to protect certain categories
 
of information. Both are vital to the
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welfare of our people. 32
 
Thus, the President and the Congress affirmed that
 
all information will be released unless it specifically 
has been determined that It qualifies for exemption from 
release. The new law provides in substance that: 
Every agency shall make available to the public 
information that is published In the Federal 
Register, Agency opinions and orders and 
Agency Records, except that these provisions 
shall not be applicable to matters that . . .33 
Nine exemptions to the requirement for public
 
release are then provided in the law. The first of these
 
exemptions pertains to Information "specifically required
 
by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of
 
the national defense or foreign policy."
 
S 
In passing Public Law 89-487 the Congres provided
 
an updating to the provisions of EO 10501 by reaffirming
 
that information classified in the interest of national
 
defense will be withheld from public disclosure. On
 
the other hand, the passage of this law served new and
 
continued notice of the intention of the Legislative body
 
of our Government to assure that great care is taken in
 
any decision to withhold information from the public.
 
The law also contains an important provision for any
 
member of the public to follow if an agency will not
 
32The Mosler Safe Company, The.Mosler Security
 
'Letter, August 3, 1966, p. 2.
 
33Amendmenr to the Administrati've 'Procedure Act.
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release a document that is desired, as follows:
 
Upon complaint, the district court of
 
the United States in the district in which
 
the complaintant resides, or has his principal
 
place of business, or In which the agency
 
records are situated shall have jurisdiction
 
to enjoin the agency from the withholding
 
of agency records and to order the production
 
of any agency records improperly withheld from
 
the complaintant. In such cases the court
 
shall determine the matter, de novo and the
 
burden shal 4 be upon the agency to sustain
 
its action.
 
However, a recent Federal court case on a suit to
 
force release of a document from a Government agency
 
provides interesting insight into the approach that the
 
courts may use in construing the Freedom of Information
 
(FOI) Law in cases involving suits attemptin19 to force
 
release of Information that has been classified:
 
- Epstein vs. Resor, US District Court for
 
Northern California, February 19, 1969.
 
This case involves the first exemption to the
 
general requirements of the FOI, covering
 
matters "specifically required by Executive
 
Order to be kept secret in the interest of
 
the national defense or foreign policy."
 
Epstein sued to force release of a copy of
 
a report prepared In 1948 on "Operation Keelhaul,"
 
which was classified TOP SECRET. The court
 
denied the request. This case is'significant
 
because it reinforces previous actions by
 
the courts in limiting judicial review to
 
determinations as to whether the classification
 
action was arbitrary or capricious and refusing
 
to second-guess the classifying authority.
 
The court, in effect, refused to require the
 
Government to bear the burden of proof that
 
the document was properly classified. The
 
court said: "The district courts at least
 
'have jurisdiction to determine whether the
 
34 1bId.
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exemption applies in a given situation,
 
whether classification within the first
 
exemption is clearly arbitrary and unsup­
portable." The court indicated its evaluations
 
would be limited to determining whether the
 
assigned classification was approprtate without
 
inquiring into or forcing a disclosure of
 
the very information that the classification 
was designed to protect; even in the privacy 
of the judge's chambers. 
The court said specifically: "The question 
remaining is whether or not this information
 
is 'required by Executive Order to be kept
 
secret in the interest of the national defense
 
or foreign policy,' in answering this question,
 
the court is limited to determining whether
 
the Secretary of the Army has acted capriciously
 
in exercising the authority granted to him
 
by Executive Order 10501. Although the infor­
mation before the court is not extensive, it
 
is sufficient for rendering a deision on
 
the issue of summary judgment.'13
 
Thus, it appears from this decision that in suits
 
attempting to force release of classified information,
 
the courts will not place any burden on an agency that
 
initiates classified information toprove the validity
 
of such classification If it is satisfied that the agency
 
did not act capriciously.
 
Reports are now being assembled on the interpretations
 
of the Courts that handle complaints under this law against
 
Federal agencies that have declined to release information
 
on the basis it is exempted from required release under
 
the law. In a recent report Si A4 Upson provided the
 
following analysis:
 
It has been'speculated that it will take
 
35 Law Week, 37 LW 2489.
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considerable judicial review to clear up
 
certain areas. There has been some review
 
in the courts since the passage of the Act,
 
but not nearly as much as was anticipated
 
by many. During the first year of the Act, 
31 cases 	were filed in Federal District Courts 
under the judicial review provision. By the end
 
of the year, 20 were still pending final decision
 
and 11 were closed. Here is the box score of
 
the 11 that were closed:
 
- Six upheld withholding of the information
 
by the Government,
 
- Two upheld disclosure
 
- In two cases, the Government's defense con­
vinced the plaintiffs to drop their suits,
 
- In one case, the plaintiff obtained his
 
information by other means and did not
 
contest the Government's motion to dismiss
 
the suit.
 
From all 	this I Identify only two cases clearly
 
going in 	favor of the pl ntlff. . . . I
 
do see a trend.3
think we 

The significant implications of this recent legislation
 
to classification management are analyzed in Chapter VI.
 
36Si A. Upson, "The Freedom of Information Act,"
 
Seminar: Classification' Manag.ement at th'e Working
 
Level, pp. 50-51.
 
CHAPTER V
 
COMPARATIVE CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS
 
Only a limited amount of descriptive information
 
concerning classification programs In other countries is
 
available in the open literature. Most countries throughout
 
the world have established a system of classification
 
similar to that practiced In the United States. The
 
U. S. Department of Transportation has Identified the
 
3 7
 equivalent foreign language classifications jof 74 countries.
 
(See Figure 1.)
 
In an article describing the security classification
 
program of the Soviet Union, Zile, Sharlet and Love
 
described a state secret as "information of state importance
 
especially protected by the state. It Includes data of
 
military, economic and foreign policy character." Among
 
the several types of information of a military nature,
 
they say that the following are included:
 
(14) discoveries and inventions of a major
 
military significance;
 
(15) discoveries and inventions of major
 
scientific and economic significance before
 
the grant by heads of ministries and depart­
ments of permission for their publication;
 
37Department of Transportation Instruction, DOT
 
1600.22, May 19, 1969, p. 39.
 
FIGURE ].--Table of Equivalent Foreign Language Classifications
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(18) such other Information as may be added
 
by the Council of Ministers of the USSR to
 
the list of matters subject to state secrecy.
 
The authors noted further that,
 
Unfortunately, little is known about the
 
actual administration of the security
 
classification system [in Russia]: The
 
application of secrecy laws 3 tself is by and
 
large enveloped in secrecy.
 
In commenting further on the administration of the program
 
in the Soviet Union they noted that ". . . as the final
 
approval agency, the NKVD (state security organization)
 
had the decisive voice."
 
The effect of this intense secrecy in the Soviet
 
Union has caused the technological advancement of that
 
country considerable difficulties because of its leaders
 
obsession with secrecy, according to Aviation Week and
 
Space Technoloqy editor Robert Hotz. In citing some
 
specific examples, he wrote:
 
Some of the Soviet secrecy is truly ridiculous,
 
Sergei Korolev, the guiding genius of the
 
initial phase of the Soviet space program,
 
worked in official anonymity until he died.
 
The name of his successor Is a state secret.
 
The identity of the recent Soyuz mission
 
director is also concealed from the Soviet
 
people . . . The recent Soyuz missions
 
(failure ofSoyuz 7 and 8 to dock as the mission
 
plan specified) demonstrated clearly how far
 
behind the Soviets have fallen In their
 
manned space program with their introspective
 
38 Zugurds L. Zile, Robert S. Sharlet, and Jean F,
 
Love, "Classification in Russia," National Classificat-ion
 
,Manage.men't S'dciety Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1, 196B,
 
pp. 7-9.
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If classification of research and development
 
information has, in reality, caused the significant
 
problems and delays to U. S, science development, as
 
claimed by the authors quoted in Chapter II, then Hotz'
 
observations about the similar problem in the comparatively
 
clandestine Soviet Union would certainly seem to be
 
warranted.
 
The issue of science vs. secrecy in governmental
 
organizations is truly a problem faced also by nations
 
other than the United States. In the United States (as
 
probably in others), a careful analysis and continuing
 
realistic approach to classification is needed in order
 
to assure that classification wI Ilserve,' rather than
 
disserve the national interest.
 
In those existing science agencies in the United
 
States that have a classification respons'ibility In
 
. 
accordance with EO 10501, the responsibiIity for the
 
management of the classification program Is usually
 
delegated by the agency head to another official. This
 
official is ordinarily designated as the Security Classifi­
cation Officer of the agency. This function ordinarily
 
is assigned to an official other than the Director of
 
Security or agency Security Officer whose responsibilities
 
39Robert Hotz, "Editorial," Aviation V/ek and Space
 
Technology, Vol. 91, No. 17, Oct. 27, 19b9, p. ]I.
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include establishment of policy and procedures for safe­
guarding classified information (e.g., accountability,
 
control, access, storage, transmTssion, marking, etc.).
 
Yet these two officials must work closely together
 
In the total administration of an agency's Information
 
security program. In some cases, the Security Classifi­
cation Officer reports to the agency's Director of Security
 
or Security Officer.
 
This organizational and personnel arrangement is
 
also established at an agency's field facilities, creating
 
a communications network for an agency's classification
 
program.
 
General policy under which the agency cLassification
 
program operates Is Issued by the agency head and Classifi­
cation Guides are issued to Identify the classified and
 
unclassified Information elements of major technical
 
programs and activities with which the agency Is Involved.
 
These Guides are used and interpreted by the segments of
 
the agency that are involved with the research and
 
development activity described In the Guides.
 
The Security Classification Officer provides Inter­
pretations of classification policy and initiates classifi­
cation guidance within his jurisdiction. He provides a
 
linkage between technical personnel of the agency and
 
technical and classification personnel of other organiza­
tions.
 
PART TWO: 
ALTERNATIVES
 
CHAPTER VI
 
AN ANALYSIS OF REALISTIC CLASSIFICATION
 
APPROACHES FOR NEW SCIENCE AGENCIES
 
Intreoducti on 
It is clear from past public pronouncements of
 
many Government officials, some of whom are quoted in
 
this thesis, that classification of research Information
 
considered essential to national defense, Isnot likely
 
to be discontinued. In this chapter, the objective will
 
be to explore approaches that can serve to minimize the
 
adverse effects of the conflict between sclence and
 
secrecy. The most frequently described disagreements
 
and frustrations with the classification program, as
 
described by the scientists, have been considered in
 
development of these approaches.
 
These approaches cover a wide range of proposed
 
policies and practices for consideration in establishment
 
of a science agency classification program.
 
It is stressed that none of these approaches,
 
Individually or collectively, is a panacea for the problem
 
of solving the dlfficulties faced by Government because
 
of the basic conflict between science and secrecy. Nor
 
are all of them practical in every Government organization
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that is responsible for classification of national defense
 
information. Instead, this chapter Is an attempt to
 
describe the author's evaluation of practices that can
 
generally serve to reduce the nature of the conflict.
 
The concepts, policies and practlces discussed in this
 
chapter can be Implemented In a science agency and they
 
would all be consistent with existing laws and Executive
 
Orders.
 
'.Recognition of the Importance of
 
Classification Manariement
 
The extreme importance of classification management
 
was well expressed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
 
Security Policy, DOD, in the following remark:
 
The function of classifying information
 
is a vital part of our security program It
 
is the first step that brings all the other
 
security procedures and policies Into pl'ay.
 
Once It has been determined that Information
 
should be classified, the following security
 
measures apply: marking, physical security
 
which includes the safes, guards, alarms,
 
fences and warning devices; rules for guarding
 
transmission; access, and this involves the
 
whole super-structure of personnel security
 
standards, personnel security investigations
 
and adjudications; and then the accountability,
 
downgrading declassification, and finally
 
destruction of documents, So it Is essential
 
that classification judgments be properly made
 
In the first Instance. On the one hand, while
 
the failure to classify properly may be detrimental
 
to the national Interests because of the
 
unwarranted disclosure of information, the
 
failure to classify properly, on the other
 
hand, may be harmful to the national Interest
 
in that certain information that should be in
 
the public domain is not, or certain Information
 
Is overclassifled, thereby requiring protection
 
In excess of its merits and to that extent
 
making an unnecessary claim upon and pro tanto
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security resources. 4 o
diluting our 

The importance of classification management gave
 
rise in 1964 to the National Classification Management
 
Society (NCMS) which has as its stated purpose and scope
 
the following :
 
It Is the purpose of the National Classi­
fication Management Society to advance the
 
practice of classification management as a
 
profession and to foster the highest qualities
 
of professionalism and professional competence
 
among its members. In furthering this
 
purpose, the Society provides a forum for the
 
free exchange of views and information on
 
the methods, practices and procedures for
 
managing classification programs and it engages
 
In activities for disseminating such Information
 
and for developing and refining the principli
 
and techniques of classification management.
 
The NCMS currently has six chapters and a total of
 
over 200 members throughout the United States. Its
 
members include key industry and Government officials
 
who are active In the field of classificatlop management.
 
The Society holds a national seminar each year and frequent
 
regional seminars as well as regular chapter meetings.
 
It also publishes a Journal and an Information Bulletin
 
of interest to members and others interested in this
 
subject. There has long been a need for greater communica­
tions in this field aimed at improving, updating and
 
40Joseph J. Llebling, "Government Security," Amorican
Society for Indus'trial Security Proceedins of Thirteet 
'nI " Seminar, September, 19 7, p. 73. 
41By-Laws of the National Classification Management
 
Society, Article I, Section I as described In the Journal 
of the National 'Classification Management 'Society Jouirna F 
Vol-. V, No. 1, 1969, p. 35. 
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modernizlng classification processes. This Society can
 
provide to science organiztions a means of keeping abreast
 
of developments in the field of classification management.
 
It can provide an important Informal source of Information
 
concerning the establishment of classification programs
 
In various Government agencies and solutions to problems
 
commonly experienced in management of such programs.
 
Enhancement of Realistic Classification Hanaqement
 
Through the Freedom of Information Law
 
It has been charged In the past that some agencies
 
have Incorrectly assigned a security classification to
 
Information that, If released, would be embarrasing, but
 
which contained no vital defense data. Robert Lindsey,
 
newspaperman with the San Jose Mercury News, in addressing
 
a group of classification management personnel made the
 
following observation:
 
It would be fine if everything you clas­
sified - or, putting It another way, everything 
you have restricted from public consumption 
were data that if revealed would aid and
 
comfort potential enemies. Most newsmen are
 
skeptical of your system because they have
 
discovered, usually after it is too late,
 
incidents where so-called "security" has
 
been used to hide mistakes or poor judgment;
 
or to protect a program when it is in jeopardy
 
in Congress or perhaps at the civilian DOD
 
level; or when there is an interagency fight
 
for funds or jurisdiction; or in comparable
2
 
situations.
 
The Freedom of Information Law now provides Government
 
42Lindsey, pp. 18-19.
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organizations with rather specific guidance in the form
 
of a description of the various information categories
 
that are exempt from required release to the public.
 
Eight other exempt information categories, in addition
 
to national defense informationi are listed in the new
 
law. Of particular significance are the following
 
exemption categories:
 
- Category Two deals with matters related solely
 
to the internal personnel rules and practices of
 
an agency.
 
- Category Three deals with Information specifically 
exempt from disclosure by statute. 
- Category Four deals with trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained 
from any person and privileged or confidential. 
- Category Five deals with inter-agency or intra­
agency memorandums or letters which would not 
be available by law to a private party in 
litigation with the agency. 
An agency should minimize the practice of assignment of
 
a security classification to information and definitely
 
limit such practice only to information which warrants
 
such protection. When withholding of information is
 
considered essential to an agency, and the data does
 
not warrant a defense classification, careful analysis
 
of the other exemption categories may be helpful In
 
determining whether there is valid justification for
 
49
 
limiting outside access through the means of one of the
 
other exemptions.
 
If the charge of past misuse of classification to
 
withhold release of unclassified information has any merit,
 
such action may have been taken because of uncertainty
 
of whether other means of withholding the information
 
were authorized. The Freedom of Information Law now
 
provides a degree of clarity by enumerating all of the
 
specific categories of Information that are authorized
 
to be withheld from the public. In addition , if the
 
charges have merit, the new law should have another
 
favorable impact by lessening the amount of 6lasslfled
 
information generated by the Government: although greater
 
reliance will probably be placed on the other exemptions.
 
Clas'si'fication of Research Informtion
 
One of the most difficult classification problems
 
facing science agency management is the responsibility
 
for identifying areas of information that truly warrant
 
classification. Yet broad agency wide policy and criteria
 
for classification must be established.
 
Equally difficult is administration of the system
 
of classification management, which involves preparation
 
of classification guidance for specific projects based
 
on the broad policy and criteria; periodic review to
 
assure that earlier classification decisions are still
 
warranted; communication of classification guidelines
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to those who require such information; and continued,
 
consistent interpretation of guidelines.
 
Significant interagency communications take place
 
in the security classification field. As a result, not
 
only is an agency's classification guidance followed by
 
private organizations under contract, but also by any
 
other government organizations, involved in related
 
technical areas of effort. The "lead" agency in such
 
relationships is generally expected to provide classifi­
cation criteria for the whole field of effort. In this
 
way, decisions made to classify information have an
 
impact far beyond the limits of the originating organization.
 
Howard Maines, Security Classification Officer for
 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, stressed
 
that the total national interest should be considered
 
when classification is contemplated:
 
In determining what information should
 
be classified, the most important basic factor
 
that should be considered is whether the
 
national interest will be served by making
 
the information generally available or to
 
classify it and thus limit its dissemination.
 
An important and noteworthy distinction between
 
basic research and technological development has been
 
made by Robert J4, Seeger, former Deputy Assistant Director
 
of the National Science Foundation:
 
It is my thesis that blanket security
 
43Howard G. Haines, "The 
NASA Security Classification
 
Program," Industrral S'ecurity, October, 1963, p. 120.
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which includes basic research does not
 
guarantee security; Indeed, it tends to insecurity
 
by insisting upon care where it is not needed
 
and thus cheapening the value of care where
 
it is vital. I would argue that we should 
clearly differentiate between basic research 
and technological development and have appropriate 
security measures for each. . . . I would, 
therefore, argue strongly for complete freedom 
for all basic research'. I would maintain that 
National Security will be enhanced by the 
very increasing of such freedom, that it
 
might well be endangered by Ignorant attempts
 
to set up veils of security - we would probably
 
be ensuring our own ignorance more than that
 
of others! Mind you, I am speaking of basic
 
research - not development - as the necessary
 
foundation for our continuing technological
 
progress*44
 
Some agencies instruct their employees to follow
 
the extremely broad and doubtfully adequate language of
 
Executive Order 10501t for the purpose of making classifi­
cation determinations of technological research Information
 
in the interests of national defense. Others provide the
 
additionally needed guidance for employees, which assures
 
a more consistent agency approach.
 
For example, regulations applicable to such activities
 
as the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
 
Administration provide for classification of information
 
such as "particulars of scientific or research projects
 
which incorporate new technological developments or
 
techniques having direct application of vital importance
 
to the national defense." 4 5
 
44 Raymond J. Seeger, "Security and United States Tech­
nological Progress," Industrial Security, Oct., 1958, pp. 42-43.
 
45Department of Transportation Instructi-on, p. 15.
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Among the several criteria used by NASA In malting
 
positive classification determinations are the following:
 
Information which provides the United States,
 
in comparison with other nations with a signifi­
cant scientific, engineering, technical,
 
operational, Intelligence, strategic or tactical
 
advantage related to national defense; and
 
information which reveals an unusually signifi­
cant scientific or technological "breakthrough"
 
which there is sound reason to believe is not
 
known to or within the state of the art
 
capability of other nations, if the breakthrough
 
supplies the United States with an important
 
military advantage of a technological nature;
 
classification also would be appropriate if
 
the potential military application of the
 
information, although not specifically
 
visualized, would afford the United States a
 
significant military4 gdvantage in terms of tech­
nologic 1 lead time. 
The establishment, publication and communication 
of classification criteria for research information, 
which provides more explanation beyond the very general
 
standards provided by Executive Order 10501, is urged
 
for new science agencies. Such criteria will help assure
 
more consistent interpretations within the agency and
 
will ultimately result in mori precise classification
 
decisions throughout Government.
 
Requirement for Intelligence Support 
Joseph J. Liebling, Director of Security Policy,
 
Department of Defense, described the need for protection
 
of advanced state-of-the-art information of interest to
 
46 National Aeronautics and Space Administration . 
Criteria, pp. 11-12. 
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the nation's defense, as follows:
 
What this means is that researchers
 
need to understand the nature of scientific
 
and technological progress in various disci­
plines that will represent a sufficiently
 
important change in our military posture
 
to warrant security classification. It is
 
necessary, it seems to me, to identify and
 
to state the levels of performance, capability
 
• . . that constitute a defenq advantage of
 
I
some kind over other nations."
 
In order to make a judgment on a comparison of the
 
relative state-of-the-art in a particular technological
 
activity between this country and others, it is necessary
 
to know the status of development in the foreign country.
 
In some cases this can be obtained from the open literature.
 
In others, reliance on intelligence information of some
 
sort may be required.
 
The government's position with regard to the useful­
ness of the intelligence product was expressed by George
 
MacClain, Director for Classification Management,
 
Department of Defense, as follows:
 
Generally, what the public already knows
 
is beyond the reach of useful security classi­
fication. However, when we have exhausted the
 
publicly known state of the art, we then depend
 
upon U. S. intelligence research and reporting
 
in order to reach an evaluation of the not
 
yet public known state-of-the-art in foreign
 
countries.
 
At the present time, there are no formal inter-agency
 
47Joseph J. Liebling, "Government Security; The
 
Policy, the Purpose," Industrial Security, Feb., 1968, p. 18.
 
4 8George McClain, "Panel--Government Classification
 
Management Policies and Programs," NCMS Jdurnal, II (1966), p. 71.
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relationships which bring organizations having a need
 
for the intelligence product together with intelligence
 
organizations. A science organization, involved in
 
research which is believed to possibly warrant classifi­
cation consideration, will need to establish a contact
 
with an intelligence organization, make its requirements
 
known and attempt to secure needed assistance In this
 
manner,
 
Need for Close Cooperation and Early Communication
 
with the Scientists on Classificatio Matters
 
The requirement for sound management of a security'
 
classification program is especially important in a
 
science organization. It is also more difficult according
 
to Frank Thomas, Assistant Director for DDR&E for Nuclear
 
Programs of the Office of the Secretaryr6f Defense.
 
Thomas, whose past experience includes work in the nuclear
 
weapons programs for Sandia Corporation, said:
 
I'd like to say that the whole training
 
of the scientist is that he likes to see the
 
logic of the situation. It's very difficult
 
for him to see the entire logic of a classi­
fication procedure, most of which is out of
 
view. It's much easier for a man on the
 
production line to be told that something is
 
classified and he doesn't question it. The
 
whole scientific viewpoint is to question
 
everything and i4 is very difficult in a classi­
fication matter.
 
Thus, we see that a very careful, and sometimes,
 
49Frank Thomas, "Panel--Science and Technology, and
 
Classification Management," National Classification
 
Management Journal., Vol. 11, l66b p. 59,
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detailed explanation for the scientist of the rationale
 
behind the classification philosophy for limiting access
 
to a particular scientific effort is needed. Coupled
 
with this requirement is the need for management to
 
assure that an early relationship be established between
 
the scientists and persons perForming classification
 
management activities. Dr. Everett Welmers, Assistant
 
for Technical Operations of the Manned Systems Division
 
of the Aerospace Corporation, stressed this point in the
 
following remark;
 
This contact (between the classification
 
manager and the scientists] has to be made
 
relatively early. It is very unfortunate if
 
a program gets months and months down the
 
line and suddenly a classification structure
 
Is imposed on it. This has to be developed
 
right from the start of the program with
 
the scien6sts and classification man
 
together.
 
Applicationof Need-t&-Know Principle
 
It is recalled that in Chapter 11 we saw that many
 
scientists complain that the classification of information
 
greatly restricts the flow of needed communications among
 
those scientists who can contribute to advancement of
 
particular disciplines. Here, the practical problem
 
is twofold. First, through the Government's security
 
clearance program, access to information is limited to
 
50 Everett Welmers, "Panel--Science and Technology,
 
and Classification Management," National Classification
 
Management Journal, Vol. II, 1966, p. 60.
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only those persons in Government, industry and universities
 
having an access authorization at or above the appropriate
 
classification level of the information. Second, however,
 
is commonly called "need-to-know."
is the restriction which 

The concept of the "need-to-know" principle is that
 
knowledge shall be .provided to only those persons who
 
have the requisite access authorization, and among these,
 
only to those persons whose official duties require such
 
access. Since the responsibility for determining the
 
"need-tolknow" of a prospective recipient rests upon
 
those individuals who already have the knowledge) it
 
can be seen that a considerable degree of latitude in
 
judgment is possible.
 
Some "need-to-know" judgments have been made very
 
narrowly and rigid restrictions have resulted. Greater
 
recognition) however, of the need for a liberal inter­
pretation of the "need-to-know" principle has recently
 
been evidenced, particularly in the field of scientific
 
research activity.
 
This trend is apparent, for examplej in analysis
 
of a statement by Donald Garrett) a key Department of
 
Defense classification official in comments relating to 
application of the "need-to-know" principle in private 
research organizations. Garrett said: 
In many fields of interest, a general
 
need-to-know exists among all or many partici­
pants in that field of interest. To facilitate
 
military developments, to conserve resources,
 
to make maximum use of available expertise,
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to eliminate wasteful duplication and to
 
reduce costs, it becomes important to ensure
 
a free flow of scientific and technical informa­
tion among the community Involved in'a particular
 
field of interest may well have a reasonable
 
need for all available information to assist
 
in performance under the contract. Private
 
facilities which do not have current contracts
 
should be considered to have a legitimate
 
need-to-know for classified information.
 
The information is needed to maintain their 
capabilities as developers and producers of 
future equipments or advanced generations of 
existing equipments. . . . In all these i cases, 
however, the nature of the contribution 4the private 
facilities can make to national defense 'must be 
more than theoretical, it must be actual and 
demonstrab%, although not necessarily
"
 immediate, 

One Government facility at which the approach
 
described by Garrett is fully used is at the Los Alamos
 
Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico. Programs at this
 
facility range from highly classified to unclassified.
 
According to Dr. R. E. Schreiber, Technical Associate
 
Director of the facili ty, the practice is to have all
 
personnel cleared for maximum access to progrjam activities
 
at the laboratory. 5 2 This results in maximi;ing the needed
 
interchange of ideas necessary to help foster research
 
developments.
 
Management of an agency, facility or other organization
 
responsible for development of a particular area of
 
classified research or development should make a positive
 
determination as to the application of the "need-to-know"
 
5 1Garrett, pp. 2-3.
 
5 2 1nterview with Dr. R. E. Schreiber, Technical Associate
 
Directoro Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, on Nov. 21, 1969.
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principle. Then, such management philosophy should be
 
communicated to employees. These steps are essential
 
to a uniform approach. If a uniform approach-by management
 
is not established, then individual employees can be
 
expected to make their own judgments. Such judgments
 
will ordinarily be made on the basis of past experience
 
and experience with applying the "need-to-know" principle
 
will vary quite considerably. Certainly, individual depi­
sions will still be needed, but if management wishes
 
to guide these decisions, a broad policy statement should
 
be established and communicated to employees.
 
Classification of Information, Not Things
 
At the 1966 Annual Seminar of the American Society
 
for Industrial Security, George McLain of the Department
 
of Defense made an extremely important point about the
 
Government's classification program when he noted:
 
We're not classifying hardware or a model
 
t
or a piece of paper, we re classifying 
simply the information that it reveals or 
can be made to reveal, . . * . And, if we 
cannot describe in words the information we 
want to protect, we obviously cannot communicate 
it to anyone else. . . . Vie must identify 
specificall what the information is we want 
3
to protect. 

At the 1968 Annual Seminar of the National Classifi­
cation Management Society, the DOD's C. Donald Garrett
 
5 3 George McClain, "Security Classification Management,"
 
American Society for Indus'trial Security Protceedings,
 
September, 1966b, p. 38.
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made a similar observation when he noted:
 
Classification managers rightfully
 
emphasize the necessity of identifying and
 
classifying Items of information rather than
 
things . , . Firs-t of all it is information
 
that is classified. . .. Second, things,
 
documents, and hardware are classified only
 
because they contain and reveal classified
 
information. . . . Lastly, security costs
 
money, time, and effort, Our security resources
 
must be preserved and usg to protect only what
 
really needs protection.
 
The approach described by these two officials may
 
appear to bo elementary and not worthy of the apparent 
emphasis they place upon it. Yet, although this concept
 
is clearly established as a classification principle in
 
most agencies, it continues to be overlooked, ignored
 
or not understood by persons authorized to create classified
 
material. It is mentioned for this reason.
 
Toward More Precise Classification Marking,
 
A recent development in the Government security
 
program, as practiced in some agencies, has been the
 
adoption of the practice of showing the particular para­
graphs in a document that are classified or identiFying
 
in each document the reason for its classification.
 
The philosophy behind this practice is that it requires
 
the author of a document to identify the element(s) of
 
information requiring protection, rather than maling a
 
54 C. Donald Garrett, "Classifying Hardware," National
 
Classificati'on Manaoemen't Society Journal, Vol. IV,
 
No. 1, 1969, pp. 15-16.
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gross determination that the document contains "some
 
classified information." In the words of George McLaine
 
the requirement sharpens the classification
 
determinations made by the originator of the
 
document. Further the paragraph markings serve
 
as very precise classification guidance for all
 
persons who come into custody of the document
 
after the originator. 5 5
 
This assures that extractions from basic documents will
 
be correctly marked and not marked or handled as classified
 
information if they do not contain sensitive information.
 
Some objections to the requirement for paragraph
 
marking of documents such as research reports have been
 
voiced by scientific and engineering personnel employed
 
in those agencies which have imposed the so-called
 
"paragraph marking" requirement. Actually there is an
 
alternate approach for identifying the classified content
 
other than through the paragraph marking system. The
 
Department of Transportation, for example, provides the
 
following instructions to its employees:
 
When it is impractical to mark individual
 
paragraphs, a statement shall be made on the
 
document or in its text identifying the parts
 
that are classified and their assigned classifi­
cation, or an appropriate classification guide
 
shall be attached as part of the document.
 
The classification guide may be referenced if
 
it is known that the recipie is In possession
 
of the classification guide.
 
While speaking at the Fourth Annual Seminar of the
 
5 5 McClain, "Panel," p. 74 .
 
56 Department of Transportation Instruction, pp. 16-17.
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National Classification Management Society, in San
 
Francisco, July 16-18, 1968, McClain provided the following
 
progress analysis of this subject:
 
How about paragraph marking? . . . Wie
 
are sincere about it. Unless we have every­
body trying to do it, we are not going to get
 
a real test on whether or not it is as
 
practical and worthwhile as we think it is.
 
I know it will work. Some of the people who
 
dickt think it would work are finding out 5 7
it does. This is true, too, within industry.
 
The practice of requiring the clarifying identification
 
of classified content by the originator of documents on
 
some basis more specific than total document classification
 
should help overcome the problem of overclassification
 
of extracted material. New agencies should, therefore,
 
analyze their anticipated documentation activities to
 
determine if requiring some form of the more precise
 
document marking is practical for their organizations.
 
Observations
 
Some of the objections to secrecy from a portion
 
of the scientific community are basic and fundamental
 
disagreements toward any form of limitation on research
 
information. To this group, only a major modification
 
of the current Executive Order 10501 will bring any
 
relief.
 
Many of the objections and frustrations of the
 
5 7 George McClain, "Luncheon Address," National
 
Classification Manaqement Society 'Journal, Vol. IV,
 
No. 2, ]968, p. 98.
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scientists, however, are aimed toward classification
 
practices. The scientists express a need for such things
 
as a limitation on the amount of classified information,
 
a greater ability to communicate with others working in
 
their field of effort, the need to extract unclassified
 
information from classified documentation, the need for
 
recognition of the fact that secrecy inhibits further
 
discovery and the resultant necessity for well conceived
 
and realistic classification restrictions. To this
 
extent, the first assumption of this thesis is supported
 
by examination of the statements made by the scientists.
 
In-tIais regard it is optimistically noted that refined
 
and improved practi'ces are able to be developed and it
 
is through this approach that many of the conflicts
 
between science and secrecy can be minimized.
 
With regard to the second assumption of this thesis
 
concerning the lessons that can be gained from past
 
experience, it has been noted that existing organizations
 
have taken several approaches and follow practices that
 
could have potential usefulness to new agencies. Aside
 
from these, some additional approaches for ways of dealing
 
with this problem, that could be of possible value to
 
new science agencies, are also analyzed in this thesis.
 
CHAPTER VII
 
AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
 
There is a great need for research into every facet 
of the conflict between science and secrecy in order to 
further minimize the conflict between these essential, 
yet natural, rivals. Dr. B. V. Van Evera, De(an for 
Sponsored Research at George Washington University 
observed the state-of-the-art of the nation's security 
program and concluded: 
Our research in security has not matched
 
our research in the things being secured. We
 
have greatly developed the carriage, including
 
putting a rocket motor In it, but we still
 
have the whip socket th was needed when we
 
it with a horse ?
0
 
pulled 

It will, be the purpose of this chapter to briefly
 
analyze three areas of potential research that could
 
lead to fundamental improvement in the classification
 
management program as related to scientific research
 
and development information.
 
Automatic Declassification
 
Scientists working on problems of national security
 
58 Van Evera, p. 32.
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interest recognize the need and take action under existing
 
classification guidelines to withhold information from
 
the public domain when resultant developments are expected
 
to later serve a defense purpose. Yet such decisions
 
are sometimes made on a rather subjective basis due to
 
lack of certainty about the future defense value of the
 
development. In addition, information is frequently
 
retained in one of the classification categories beyond
 
the time that such restrictions are needed even though
 
guidelines declassifying the information have been pub-

Iished.
 
This is a problem that is not subject tp easy
 
solution because of the many complexities described
 
in some detail earlier in this thesis, in the quotation
 
by Mr. Price.
 
Positive action to declassify information that
 
no longer warrants protection is the first abd most
 
important action that should be taken. The need for
 
such action was stressed by W. Jack Howard, Assistant
 
for Atomic Energy matters to the Secretary of Defense:
 
Let me argue that a classification system
 
becomes unreal and prejudicial to its own
 
efficiency if too much material is involved.
 
The originators, particularly scientists,
 
have a natural pressure to keep the maximum
 
allowable amount of material out of classified
 
categories. . . . Aggressive examination of
 
the classification policies will limit the
 
size of the body of classified material and
 
in the process improve the security of what
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remains.

But prior experience hassshown that a second level
 
of effort, a fail safe action, in'the form of an automatic
 
declassification system that is time dependent is necessary
 
to purge classified files of data that no longer warrants
 
protection. Thus EO 10501 was modified in 1961 to
 
provide that much classified information be subjected
 
to automatic declassification after the passage of 12
 
years from its origination. These provisions remain in
 
effect nearly 10 years after their inception so they have
 
presumably been of value to realistic classification
 
without detriment to national security interests.
 
One of the major reasons for classification of
 
research and development information is to give protection
 
to data which will provide the country with a technological
 
development expected to give the nation a future national
 
defense advantage of some form over other countires.
 
This concept of lead-time is analyzed by Howard Malnes
 
as follows:
 
We cannot hope to maintain the secrecy of
 
such developments indefinitely. The best we
 
can expect is to keep ahead of potential
 
adversgies by a lead time interval of several
 
years.
 
59W,. Jack Howard, "Panel--The Executive Views
 
Classification Management," National Classification
 
Management Society Journal, 1:2,3,4 (1965), p. 75".
 
6OHoward G. Maines, "Panel--Government Classification
 
Management Policies and Programs,"'National Classification
 
Management Society Journal, IV:2 (1966), p. 84.
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Since science and technology are known to be advancing
 
at an ever increasing pace throughout-the world, the
 
length of time that specific research information has
 
a defense value sufficient to warrant its classification
 
may be decreasing accordingly.
 
A working hypothesis based upon this approach could
 
be established and tested with a view toward possible
 
reduction of the 12 year declassification interval to
 
a shorter time period for prescribed categories of
 
research and development information.
 
Formalizing Intelligence Support
 
The relationship between classification decisions
 
concerning research and development breakthrpughs which
 
rapidly advance the state-of-the-art and the value of
 
intelligence information was discussed in detail in
 
Chapters II and III. There is no formally recognized
 
relationship within the Government structure that brings
 
together the intelligence needs of Science Agencies with
 
those agencies of Government capable of fulfilling these
 
needs.
 
An analysis should be conducted within the Government
 
structure in order to ascertain whether a more formalized
 
relationship between such organizations through closer
 
coordination would enhance the public interest by leading
 
to an improved government wide classification program.
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Other Research Desions
 
This thesis has been concerned with measures that
 
can be adopted to resolve the conflict between science
 
and secrecy through an analysis of the existing classifi­
cation program as viewed by scientists. This is but one
 
of many approaches that could be used in analyzing the
 
problem within the context of current national policy.
 
The use of other research approaches would lead to
 
additional insight into the problem and to a,more
 
complete understanding of measures that could be used
 
to minimize the conflict.
 
The following description of research designs
 
dealing with this subject is by no means exhadstive but
 
does reflect the variety of potential approaches for
 
studying the problem.
 
An examination of classification of research informa­
tion could be approached through an analysis of the changes
 
in political-economic foreign policies of the United
 
States Government since World War II until the present
 
time and through a tracing of information classification
 
practices during this period. A cause and effect analysis
 
along these lines could be useful in projecting probable
 
future trends in the classification program
 
A research approach stressing a comparative analysis
 
of the various classification practices of existing
 
agencies could help to better identify those organizational
 
and procedural features .which have enhanced realistic
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and sound classification practices. Examples of variables
 
between agencies which could be isolated for analysis
 
purposes would include such things as the content and
 
extent of policy guidance published in accordance with
 
EO 10501 by agencies for use by their employees, the
 
degree of importance and attention placed on the classifi­
cation process by agency top management personnel, the
 
education practices of agencies directed towards consistent 
judgments by personnel authorized to initiate classifi­
cation of information, etc. 
Another form of analysis would be to use the case
 
study approach in analyzing the series of events and
 
determinations that have lead up to decisions concerning
 
major aspects of any government development program that
 
has been classified. This kind of research effort,
 
along with several others proposed in this chapter, would
 
require that the researcher have open access to information
 
in several agencies of government. Yet through the use
 
of this method the genealogy of major classification
 
actions could be identified and the effects of inter­
acting decision processes could be traced. This would
 
lead to a more complete observation of the classification
 
process because it could be viewed with a more total
 
perspective than can be accomplished through analysis
 
of a classification action within an individual agency.
 
Yet another form of comparative analysis that would
 
be of value would be a study of classifbation practices
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in older activities as compared with newer agencies to
 
ascertain the effects of organizational aging on the
 
classification process.
 
National Pol'icy
 
This thesis has dealt primarily with an analysis
 
of the options available to science agencies in dealing
 
with the conflict between science and secrecy under
 
existing laws and'executive orders. Throughout this
 
analysis the legal basis under which the security
 
classification program operates has been accepted as a
 
"given" part of the environment. The basis on which the
 
program rests is EO 10501. This Executive Order Is
 
geared to classification of military defense information.
 
Yet, it is applied to both military and non-military
 
defense information. It provides little policy guidance
 
to science agencies intent upon fulfilling their national
 
defense responsibilities but faced with the many challenges
 
of the scientific community. It provides no useful
 
information concerning criteria that should be applied
 
to information in the decision process leading to
 
classification determinations by science agencies,
 
As a result science agencies approach classification
 
from a variety of viewpoints resulting in a very non
 
uniform application of classifiqation standards, If
 
greater uniformity in classification of research and
 
development information is considered desirable, then
 
the appropriate first step should be toward reorientation
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of the national policy (EO lOS01) in the direction of
 
more descriptive guidance for use of science agencies
 
in implementing realistic classification programs.
 
The national classification system has been examined
 
several times in various studies such as that undertaken
 
by a five-man committee headed by Charles Coolidge,
 
which was appointed by the Secretary of Defense infl957.
 
However, "these studies have generally concentrated upon
 
tightening the system so as to prevent unauthorized
 
leaks of official information." 
61
 
Seldom do such studies treat the problem of assuring
 
that all of the important national interests be considered
 
in formulation of agency classification polipies. These
 
national interests can truly be balanced only by pur
 
highest officials and in Rourke's evaluation only by
 
our highest official:
 
Presidential statemenship of a high order may
 
be called for in the future if it proves
 
necessary to buy scientific progress at the
 
price of greer disclosure of scientific
 
information.
 
Extensive research and analysis by the Government
 
agencies and other institutions involved could lead to
 
proposals to the President for a more definitive national
 
policy in the form of an improved executive order.
 
61Rourke, p. 78.
 
62Rourke, p. 86.
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